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Abstract: 
How have the polices of counterterrorism and nation building by the United States 
impacted the nation of Afghanistan? Were the objectives completed and did American foreign 
policy decisions foster sustainable peace within the region? In this case study of Afghanistan, the 
role of the United States in the Soviet Resistance, the global war on terror, attempts at nation 
building, and the quest for peace will be discussed. Operation Enduring Freedom focused on 
combating Al-Qaeda and Taliban regime within Afghanistan, but soon evolved into something 
much more complex. Through reviewing the objectives and actions of United States’ foreign 
policy makers, research of the implementation of policies, as well as reports from within 
Afghanistan, it was discovered that the initial threat of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda was removed. 
However, hopes of sustainable peace and a “Pro-America” Afghanistan were not established. 
Behind a blurred legal justification and ignoring the international community's warnings, the 
preemptive strikes in the global war on terror and attempt at nation building has created national 
instability and denied the opportunity for peace to exist within Afghanistan. Beginning covertly in 
the 1980’s and publicly since 2001, the United States and coalition forces have been actively 
deployed and engaged in Afghanistan spending billions of dollars and losing thousands of lives, 












For more than four decades, the nation of Afghanistan has known nothing, but violence 
only interrupted with small stints of peace. To that end, the United States has been involved in the 
violence since the days of the Mujahedeen in 1979 and continue to this day to be deployed for 
what objective? Rationale from preventing the spread of Communism, retaliation for the events of 
9/11, pre-emptive self-defense, and state and nation building have all been used to justify the fiscal 
and physical costs of the United States being in Afghanistan. In the dawn of a new decade the 
sentiment has changed to leave, with what to show? Through all the violence and oppression, the 
Afghan citizens have been left to suffer under both the Soviet Union and the United States. Cities 
have been destroyed, infrastructure is seemingly non-existent, civil liberties are highly debated, 
and in the end the international perspective of the nation is bleak.       
 Throughout the discussion of Afghanistan there are certain concepts and terms that need to 
be defined as they are critical to the development of the argument and understanding of the ongoing 
situation. Although a recognizable term, terrorism does not have an internationally mutually 
agreed upon definition, thus the saying goes “one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.” 
The Draft League of Nations Convention drafted the definition of; “All criminal acts directed 
against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular 
persons or a group of persons or the general public.”1 Another attempt to definite terrorism was 
“taking the agreed-upon definition of war crimes (comprising deliberate attacks on civilian, 
hostage taking and killing of prisoners) and extending it to peace time. Terrorism would then 
simply be defined as the “peacetime equivalents of war crimes.”2 For this paper, I use the draft 
 
1 Conte, Alex. Security in the 21st Century: The United Nations, Afghanistan and Iraq. Aldershot: Ashgate Pub Co, 
 2007. 
2 Conte, Alex. Security in the 21st Century: The United Nations, Afghanistan and Iraq. Aldershot: Ashgate Pub Co, 
 2007. 
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definition of the Draft League of Nations Convention. The response to terrorism, known as, 
counterterrorism, and in this paper is regarded as the actions taken against willing participants or 
supporters of terrorists and terrorist organizations. Participation and support can come in multiple 
forms, including physical participation, logistical support through movement of individuals and 
supplies, as well as fiscal support. Counterterrorism operations include direct confrontation, fiscal 
actions such as freezing accounts and assets, cyber actions against communication networks, and 
establishing community relations. The topic of state-building is the process of developing and 
crafting a nation through the aid of a foreign contributor in critical components including political 
structures, economic diversity, establishment of civil liberties. State building is similar to the more 
widely used term, nation-building, but for this paper they will be used interchangeably. Nation-
building “emphasizes the importance of cultural identity which may ultimately lead calls for self-
determination” 3  The final concept of sustainable peace is derived from the United Nations 
Sustainable Development Goals where there are 17 individual goals that we promote to foster 
individual and communal lives for years to come. In order to come to the analysis and outlook for 
the United States, Taliban, Afghanistan Peace Agreement in 2020, a recent history of the 
Afghanistan and the involvement of the United States is required. This paper will chronologically 
address and recount the actions in Afghanistan focusing on the Taliban, Al Qaeda, the involvement 
of the United States starting with the USSR invasion in 1979. From there it will continue into the 
Civil War Period where the Taliban eventually came to power. The next section starts with the 
attacks of 9/11 and Operation Enduring Freedom. Closing with the discussion of peace talks, the 
future outlook of Afghanistan will be examined in accordance with current negotiations. After 
nearly forty years of involvement, has the United States succeed in its missions of counterterrorism 
 
3 Scott, Zoe. “Literature Review on State-Building.” Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, May 
2007.  
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 5 
and state building within Afghanistan? Has the investment of billions of dollars, resource and the 
cost of thousands of American lives resulted in a benefit for the United States? What will the future 
of Afghanistan look like without the United States, do they have the means to prosper and 
perpetuate peace in the region or revert back into violence?       
Literature Review:  
As previously mentioned, state building focuses on the development and creation of a 
physical structure of a state through foreign aid in a variety of areas, but there have been multiple 
studies examining different approaches and success rates of state building. Often coupled with 
state building, is the term nation building which continues with similar trends but has a very 
specific set of goals as compared to state building. Within the discussion of state building and 
nation building there are primarily two actors, being the domestic natives and international actors. 
Each category has its own sub-groups as there can be majority and minorities that have either been 
advantaged or disadvantaged in the past. International actors can take multiple forms from foreign 
nations, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) or even Multinational Corporations (MNCs). 
In terms of different types of nation building different policies exist including assimilation policies, 
accommodation, exclusionary policies and population or local ownership.      
First it is important to continue the discussion between state building and nation building 
as Zoe Scott outlined that over the years the interchangeable use of these terms has resulted in 
confusion. The study of state building is an interdisciplinary school drawing scholarship from 
topics such as political science, international relations, economics, security studies, international 
development and other social sciences.4 The focus of the state building is on the “interventionist 
 
4 Scott, Zoe. “Literature Review on State-Building.” Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, May 
2007.  
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strategies to restore and rebuild the institutions and apparatus of the state.”5 A major component 
of state-building is the contribution and efforts of external factors or foreign nations. Due to the 
use of the term nation-building from “non-academic circles, particularly the media, donors, NGOs, 
and think tanks”6 there has been confusion between the terms often resulting in state building 
operations being labeled as nation building efforts. Nation building serves to look at a different 
topic but can be related to state building as it too works to establish something within a damaged 
or struggling nation. However instead of focusing on institutions, nation building focuses on “the 
creation of a cultural identity that relates to the particular territory of the state.”7 Instead of being 
fostered by an international actor, the national identity created through nation building “is 
inherently something only an emerging society can shape itself.” 8  Nation building and state 
building have the ability to work together and state building can be even be seen as a piece of the 
nation building, but cannot be regarded as the same process.  
In Heather Gregg’s “Building the Nation: Missed Opportunities in Iraq and Afghanistan,” 
she focuses on notions of sovereignty, population ownership, and national unity as key components 
of the process of state building. The first concept in her argument rests in the power and ownership 
of the people through sovereignty. Gregg claims that “now more than ever, a state’s sovereignty 
rests with its people, and without their buy-in, states are unlikely to thrive or governments to 
succeed over the long haul.”9 In international relations sovereignty is often referred to a nation’s 
 
5 Scott, Zoe. “Literature Review on State-Building.” Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, May 
2007.  
6 Scott, Zoe. “Literature Review on State-Building.” Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, May 
2007.  
7 Scott, Zoe. “Literature Review on State-Building.” Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, May 
2007.  
8 Scott, Zoe. “Literature Review on State-Building.” Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, May 
2007.  
9 Gregg, Heather Selma. Building the Nation: Missed Opportunities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lincoln, NE: Potomac 
 Books, Incorporated, 2018. 
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individual right to govern within its own borders without fear of foreign interference. This source 
of governance and power rests in the people of the nation as “the ideas of the Enlightenment, and 
the revolution of information technologies have shifted sovereignty from governments and 
territories to the people.”10 This emphasis on the people is critical in creating lasting political 
institutions during state building as foreign assistance will not always be there while these should 
remain for centuries. Gregg believed that the people of the state are vital in the success as they not 
only serve as contributors in the process but should also benefit in the end. Expanding on the idea 
of sovereignty and the peoples’ power.          
“State building efforts also need to start with and include populations in order to create 
programs that resonate with the population and give it ownership of the effort in the here 
and now, which will pave the way for a population that supports the state and its various 
institutions.”11            
 
The institutions built and developed during state building play in the vital role in protecting and 
promoting the people but will not lead to success without what Gregg calls “national-unity 
building.”12             
 Beyond the physical institutions and systems that are developed, Gregg argues that there 
needs to be national unity building where similar ideas and outlooks throughout the community 
are created. These ideas should be focused on their own and national future and where the “state 
needs a population that coheres and supports the government and other state institutions for it to 
flourish.”13 Gregg made it clear that there is more to state building than just the construction of 
institutions by a foreign party. Instead, a dynamic is required between the assistance and the native 
 
10 Gregg, Heather Selma. Building the Nation: Missed Opportunities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lincoln, NE: Potomac 
 Books, Incorporated, 2018. 
11 Gregg, Heather Selma. Building the Nation: Missed Opportunities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lincoln, NE: Potomac 
 Books, Incorporated, 2018. 
12 Gregg, Heather Selma. Building the Nation: Missed Opportunities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lincoln, NE: Potomac 
 Books, Incorporated, 2018. 
13 Gregg, Heather Selma. Building the Nation: Missed Opportunities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lincoln, NE: Potomac 
 Books, Incorporated, 2018. 
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and in the end, it is the citizens of the nation that not only have the original source of power, but 
also the power to make the foreign efforts and assistance last for decades.     
 The involvement of the individual and people within a nation is the guiding principle in 
Thiessen Chuck’s “Local Ownership if Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: Shouldering Responsibility 
for Sustainable Peace and Development” through the theory of local ownership. Chuck explains 
that local ownership, “becomes a personal, as well as political, activity in war-torn contexts 
experiencing outside intervention.”14 The two key concepts of local ownership in state building 
are the beliefs and actions of the citizens of the nation and then the foreign actions. Local 
ownership requires “that a country and its people decide for themselves what sort of peacebuilding 
activities are conducted and in what manner. As such it is both a process and an outcome in having 
local actors vitally engaged in peacebuilding design and action.”15 However there is a struggle 
with the local ownership theory due to “the unproven nature of local ownership” and the fact that 
results “are largely unconfirmed empirically.”16        
 In review of the theory the reality of implementation is recognized by Chuck usually due 
to the state of the nation as “there appears to be a major gap between the vision laid out… and the 
reality on the ground.”17 One of the major questions who is part of the local group to decide the 
ownership of the nation. Additionally, the legitimacy of local groups can potentially create an issue 
due to the true intentions of these local groups and different standards in comparison to the foreign 
or international expectations. With all of these potential issues addressed by Chuck, it is important 
 
14 Thiessen, Chuck. Local Ownership of Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: Shouldering Responsibility for Sustainable 
Peace and Development. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014.  
15 Thiessen, Chuck. Local Ownership of Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: Shouldering Responsibility for Sustainable 
Peace and Development. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014.  
16 Thiessen, Chuck. Local Ownership of Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: Shouldering Responsibility for Sustainable 
Peace and Development. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014.  
17 Thiessen, Chuck. Local Ownership of Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: Shouldering Responsibility for Sustainable 
Peace and Development. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014.  
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to remember that local ownership promotes the sovereignty and places the future of a nation in the 
responsibility of the locals.          
 Mylonas Harris’s “The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and 
Minorities” worked to address different approaches as well as certain circumstances that could be 
favorable for different parties during the nation building process. Harris focused on three policies 
she labeled as Assimilationist Policies, Accommodation, and Exclusionary Policies.18 Each of 
these policies’ outcomes are dependent in domestic and international influences. The “goal of 
assimilationists policies is to secure the loyalty of an individual or a community by “conquering” 
their belief system and ensuring their obedience to the national state.”19 This is often done through 
education, occupational, matrimonial, demographic, and political policies targeted at a specific 
group or the entire nation. Assimilation has the potential to be implemented through violence as 
well through colonialization by a non-core group, or an exclusion of a non-core group and forced 
assimilation for the rest of the members.20 Accommodation work to establish minority groups 
which “are more or less respected and institutions that regulate and perpetuate these differences 
are put in place.”21 These minority groups are granted rights and access to institutions but at the 
cost of national loyalty. The end result of this policy is the creation of nationally recognized 
minority groups. Harris’s last policy was, exclusionary policies which “refer to policies that aim 
at the physical removal of a non-core group from a host state (or specific areas of it).”22 Tactics of 
 
18 Mylonas, Harris. Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013.  
19 Mylonas, Harris. Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013.  
20 Mylonas, Harris. Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013.  
21 Mylonas, Harris. Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013.  
22 Mylonas, Harris. Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013.  
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this policy include population exchange, deportation, internal displacement, pogroms, or even 
mass killing. Each tactic has its own benefits and costs both physical and fiscal, and one measure 
of success can be based on security. The creation of institutions and systems in order to foster 
assimilation is much greater than the policy accommodation and enabling a minority to exist but 
if the assimilation is success the security risk is much lower than enabling a minority class to exist. 
In terms of exclusionary, the fiscal cost would depend on the systems used to target the non-core 
group, but the reputational cost and threat of security depending on the policies used potentially 
could outweigh the benefits.          
 With these three different policies there are also three different actors: the host state, non-
core group, and external powers. According to Harris the host state is “the elites governing the 
national state in the name of the “core group” and this core group “refers to all the inhabitants of 
a country who share a common national type in one or more ways just outlined [official language, 
nation historiography, official religion, common cultural customs].”23 The non-core group is a 
“group category who are conscious of their difference from the dominant national type without 
necessarily being mobilized around this difference” thus she reframes using the term minority as 
the non-core group is not a reference to population size. The final actor Harris discusses is the 
external power who can be “a neighboring state, a great power, a diaspora group, or a 
combination.”24 External powers are the most important actors in nation building as they are the 
primary source of support such as; “financial, military, political and other support to the non-core 
 
23 Mylonas, Harris. Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013.  
24 Mylonas, Harris. Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013.  
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group”25 The success of nation building is the result depends on the relationship between these 
three actors and which of the three policies is used.        
 In her paper, Harris spent a great deal of time outlining the role of the external power and 
historically how external powers have behaved in nation building and the long term effects of 
external power intervention. For centuries, external powers have used their power to influence and 
gain control of territories from the Napoleonic Era to the 21st century in a post-Cold War era. It is 
important to create the distinction in external power with “external interference, which refers 
mainly to covert or clandestine operations during peace time, and external intervention, which 
refers to overt operations that take place once there is a conflict between a host state and a non-
core group.”26 Harris sites multiple viewpoints that are used to explain the reasoning of either 
interference or intervention including: “ethnic ties between the non-core group and the external 
power, psychology of the groups, relative power dynamic between the external power and the host 
state, democratization or humanitarian considerations, or to promote the external power’s preferred 
outcome.”27  The actions of external powers, either interference or intervention, are the most 
important actions with the process of nation building as they will result in the relationship between 
the core and non-core groups in which Harris predicted multiple outcomes depending on varying 
circumstances.             
 The last component of Harris’s argument was her series of prediction and explanations for 
the outcomes of nation building depending on the relationship and circumstance between the core 
group, non-core group, and external powers. These predictions were broken up into categories 
 
25 Mylonas, Harris. Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013.  
26 Mylonas, Harris. Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013.  
27 Mylonas, Harris. Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities. Cambridge, UK:
 Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
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focusing with domestic and internal categories. The domestic categories are: 
“Primordialism/Cultural Distance, States Reversal/Ethnic Antipathy, and Reputation”28 while the 
international predictions are: “The Dark Side Democracy, and National Homeland”.29 (See Figure 
1 for explanation of each prediction.) Harris’s work on the actors and policies of nation building 
provides a framework as well as predictions of this concept to have a variety of outcomes 
depending on the parties involved that each have their own individual history.   
 While the individual components of nation and state building vary, it is important to 
understand the modern application and practice of nation-building since the conclusion of the 
Second World War. After the defeat of the Axis powers, the United States and the Allied powers 
began operations in Germany and Japan to reconstruct the war torn states in what Dodge calls 
“Westphalian peacekeeping.”30 In the Westphalian peacekeeping model, “peacekeeping was used 
as a mechanism for great power management, imposing order on conflicts that threatened to 
destabilize the international system”31 and relied heavily on previously established foundations 
including established borders and defined states. In addition to these foundations, this model calls 
for an established nation to facilitate the nation building. Former President of the Council on 
Foreign Relations and formerly the director of policy planning for the state department during the 
invasion of Iraq, Richard Haass was a firm supporter of the Westphalian Peacekeeping model: 
“It is one thing to oust a regime, quite another to put something better in its place. 
Prolonged occupation of the sort the United States carried out in Japan and West Germany 
 
28 Mylonas, Harris. Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013.  
29 Mylonas, Harris. Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013.  
30 Dodge, Toby. “Intervention and Dreams of Exogenous Statebuilding: The Application of Liberal Peacebuilding 
 in Afghanistan and Iraq.” Review of International Studies 39, no. 5 (October 8, 2013): 1189–1212.  
 https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210513000272. 
31 Dodge, Toby. “Intervention and Dreams of Exogenous Statebuilding: The Application of Liberal Peacebuilding 
 in Afghanistan and Iraq.” Review of International Studies 39, no. 5 (October 8, 2013): 1189–1212.  
 https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210513000272. 
12
Academic Festival, Event 2 [2021]
https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/acadfest/2021/all/2
 13 
after World War II is the only surefire way to build democratic institutions and instill 
democratic culture.”32 
      This model has merits, but there is also a criticism that the Westphalian model fails to address 
“that the success of external state-building is shaped by the preexisting conditions in the target 
state.”33 Which begs the question what happens where established and recognized borders and 
nationalism are not present in the operation? In the wake of the Cold War and collapse of the 
USSR, these situations arose, and Dodge developed another model of peacekeeping.  
However, at the conclusion of the Cold War, violence began to emerge across the Soviet 
satellites, and in these conflicts the Westphalian model could not be applied as previous borders 
were the source of this conflict due to ethnic tensions. At this same time, there became a greater 
sentiment for the use of international coalitions and organizations so the “1990s not only saw an 
increase in United Nations peacekeeping missions but also a steady expansion in the ambitious 
goals they were created to achieve.”34 As a result the Westphalian model disappeared “‘post-
Westphalian’ peacekeeping has gone through two subsequent transformations, from conflict 
resolution to peacebuilding, in an attempt to find increasingly complex solutions.”35 Compared to 
the previous model that was a reaction to threats to the international system, the new era called for 
proactive conflict resolution and total development of the state and nation. Additionally, Dodge 
“estimates that of the 49 UN-mandated peacekeeping operations undertaken between 1989 and 
 
32 Dodge, Toby. “Intervention and Dreams of Exogenous Statebuilding: The Application of Liberal Peacebuilding 
 in Afghanistan and Iraq.” Review of International Studies 39, no. 5 (October 8, 2013): 1189–1212.  
 https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210513000272. 
33 Monten, Jonathan. “Intervention and State-Building: Comparative Lessons from Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan.” 
The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 656, no. 1 (2014): 173–91. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716214546989.  
34 Dodge, Toby. “Intervention and Dreams of Exogenous Statebuilding: The Application of Liberal Peacebuilding 
 in Afghanistan and Iraq.” Review of International Studies 39, no. 5 (October 8, 2013): 1189–1212.  
 https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210513000272. 
35 Dodge, Toby. “Intervention and Dreams of Exogenous Statebuilding: The Application of Liberal Peacebuilding 
 in Afghanistan and Iraq.” Review of International Studies 39, no. 5 (October 8, 2013): 1189–1212.  
 https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210513000272. 
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2011, 34 had a commitment to state building in their remit.”36 As the world shifted into the 21st 
century, the situations continue to increase in complexity, with more factors and actors which need 
to be addressed in order to have a successful nation building mission. Regardless the local 
ownership principles from Chuck and sovereignty of local populations ideas from Gregg need to 
be considered whether the Westphalian or Post-Westphalian model is being applied.  
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan:  
 Although originally disputed within the ranks of the Union of the Soviet Social Republics, 
in 1979 the Soviet military officially launched its invasion of Afghanistan and began an era foreign 
influence within the nation. At this point the Soviets were actively preparing for a conflict with 
the United States and as a result of a military build-up, readily possessed an occupational force. In 
“December 27th, 1979, there were 50,000 Soviet forces in Afghanistan, with 5,000 troops and 
Spetsnaz, the Soviet Union’s elite special forces, in position around Kabul.”37 Soon after, the 
Soviets were able to seize the capital in Kabul and put in place Babrak Karmal. Karmal and the 
Soviets were not peacefully received across the nation and instead the invasion turned into a 
“decade long war that followed, it is believed that a million Afghans were killed and five million 
became refugees. Soviet bombers wiped whole villages off the map.”38 Although violence waged 
throughout the countryside, urban life in Afghanistan flourished under Soviet control.   
 While the Soviets entered with tanks and bombers, once they reached the urban cities their 
tactics took a different turn as they began to support native Afghan civilians. For instance, in  
 
36 Dodge, Toby. “Intervention and Dreams of Exogenous Statebuilding: The Application of Liberal Peacebuilding 
 in Afghanistan and Iraq.” Review of International Studies 39, no. 5 (October 8, 2013): 1189–1212.  
 https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210513000272. 
37 Jones, Seth G. In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 
 2010. 
38 Gopal, Anand. No Good Men among the Living: America, the Taliban, and the War through Afghan Eyes. New 
York, NY: Picador, 2015.  
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Anand Gopal’s interview with Heela, a native Afghan woman who was a teenager when the 
Soviets arrived, she indicated she had access to education, healthcare, and housing that had never 
been seen before. In her words, “they (Soviets) helped build Kabul. We liked them for that… There 
was complete freedom in those days… No one could tell a woman where to go or what to do.”39 
When she was seventeen she was accepted into Kabul University to major in economics and upon 
the completion of her degree she was hired as a teacher while also working for the World Health 
Organization was a mid-wife. She was even able to have a say in her own marriage that broke the 
traditional practice of parental arrangement. Urban life under the Soviets represented a modernized 
and almost Western point of view, but these practices were not carried out of the cities. Outside 
the cities, the Soviets were faced with a daunting task of controlling the mountainous countryside 
that was home to Afghan citizens who did not share the same perspective as Heela. Within the 
urban centers of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union successfully accomplished state building missions 
with expanded access to education and employment. These missions were not carried out into the 
rural areas of Afghanistan, as for the better part of the decade there was constant armed conflict 
between the Soviets and Afghans.    
 Under the Soviet Union, the nation building techniques used in Afghanistan would be 
labeled as “National Homeland” with a non-core ruling party. While the Soviets held control of 
Afghanistan, they held a puppet government that ignored the principles Gregg called for with the 
source of national sovereignty coming for the people.40 Although a population of Afghanistan, 
such as Heela, benefitted from the Soviet leadership, the core group of Afghanistan did not share 
the same opinions. The Soviets based their Afghan policies on assimilation within the major cities 
 
39 Gopal, Anand. No Good Men among the Living: America, the Taliban, and the War through Afghan Eyes. New 
York, NY: Picador, 2015.  
40 Gregg, Heather Selma. Building the Nation: Missed Opportunities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lincoln, NE: Potomac
 Books, Incorporated, 2018. 
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such as Kabul by increasing access to a variety of services. These state building missions were a 
success within the cities, but they lacked widespread assimilation to the entire core group 
throughout the nation especially in the rural mountains.41 Acting as the external power, the Soviets 
used their direct force to gain control over Afghanistan, but they failed to achieve nationwide 
attempts at nation building or state building which plagued their occupation.    
Resistance Against the Soviets: 
During the initial stages of the Soviet occupation, there was a significant population of 
Afghanis who fled into neighboring Pakistan, which created a unique population. By the mid-
1980’s there was thousands of young Muslims who had lost their homes, sometimes parents, in 
search of guidance and already practicing Muslims. It was with this population the local madrassas 
were able to benefit the most and enlarge their sphere of influence into the Afghan youth that 
lacked an identity.42 Located in Pakistan, these madrassas provided Islamic education through their 
own interpretation of sacred texts and lifestyle practices. The power of these Madrassas was soon 
recognized not only by the members within the various bodies, but also actors you sought to gain 
influence in Afghanistan against the Soviets. Although each school have differences in leadership, 
objectives, and tribal history, the greatest importance across the Madrassas was removing the 
Soviets from Afghanistan and they united under the name Mujahedeen.43 Initially foreign support 
was covert through fiscal support from Saudi Arabia and logistical support of Pakistan, however 
involvement became overt when the power of the Mujahedeen movement was recognized. The 
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan became to take a larger role in the establishment of 
training facilities and tactical training. Then “as it became clear that the Afghan War was hurting 
 
41 Mylonas, Harris. Politics of Nation-Building:Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities. Cambridge, UK: 
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the Soviets, the United States began to covertly support the Afghan insurgents,”44 thus the United 
States began its saga into Afghanistan.          
 Since the end of World War II, the United States had been engaged in the Cold War against 
the Soviet Union, resulting in numerous proxy wars across the globe, and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan promoted another opportunity for the US to oppose the Soviets. At this point the 40th 
President and Commander in Chief, Ronald Regan’s goal was to end the Cold War with a victory 
for the United States. Early on, the US was covertly providing “about $60 million per year to the 
Afghan Mujahideen between 1981 and 1983,” 45  but that was just the beginning. Seth Jones 
attributes Charlie Wilson as a “major catalyst… who saw the war as a chance to punish the Soviet 
Union for Vietnam” and with his congressional efforts, US support to the Mujahideen 
exponentially increased. By the end it is estimated that the United States spent anywhere between 
$4 billion and $5 billion between 1980 to 1992, which was matched the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
in nearly $4 billion in support to the Mujahideen. United States aid was handled by the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA): 
The CIA was deeply involved in the distribution of wealth, providing money, arms 
(including heavy machine guns, SA-7s [Stinger Missile], and Oerlikon antiaircraft 
cannons), technical advice on weapons and explosives, strategic advice, intelligence, and 
sophisticated technology such as wireless interception equipment.46    
 
 With billions in international resources the Mujahideen evolved from a refugee force into 
a modernized military. The native knowledge of the region and landscape coupled with modern 
military technology continued to deny the Soviets the ability to control all of Afghanistan. At its 
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peak strength the Mujahideen had a force of over 30,000 drawing forces from across the Muslim 
world, who successfully drove the Soviets out by the end of 1989.       
 When examining the policies used by the Soviets there were attempts in state building 
through the construction of schools and infrastructure within the urban centers. Communist 
development policies provided new opportunities for Afghans that did not exist before the invasion. 
However, these state building attempts were strictly confined to urban centers mainly due to the 
Mujahideen’s control of rural Afghanistan. These institutions only had hope to survive while the 
Soviets maintained control of the cities and backed the government. However, this rigid control 
prevented any true opportunities for nation building within. Barbark Kamal and later Doctor 
Najibullah were part of a non-core group from an elite class of Afghanistan that benefitted from 
Soviet control as compared to the core group of the nation that lived in the rural areas where the 
Soviets constantly bombarded. The policies were highly exclusionary and only benefitted the non-
core group in order to protect the domestic reputation of those in power.47 With minimal success 
in state building and no real attempts in nation building providing avenues for the core group of 
Afghanistan to have success, Soviets had no lasting impact.   
 The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was critical to the future of the nation in terms of 
international relationships and domestic control. The rise of Mujahideen resulted in an Islamically 
radicalized and militarized youth both within Afghanistan and through the Muslim World. 
Muslims traveled all the way from Saudi Arabia, Jordan and North Africa all to aid in the fight, 
and once the fighting subsided, they either returned to their homeland with connections and 
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resources or remained in Afghanistan, as residents with no ties to their host nation.48 Furthermore, 
there was an investment of over $10 billion dollars into the Mujahideen to create an army to combat 
the Soviets with no training in running a government and establishing an infrastructure. The short-
term objective of the West was defeating the Soviets by creating violence and chaos. And it lacked 
a long-term objective of establishing a functioning state.    
Civil War and the Rise of the Taliban: 
 With the departure of the Soviet Forces in 1989, an absence of power and control of 
Afghanistan quickly emerged as Najibullah’s regime lost is strength and collapsed in 1992 
bringing the country into a spiral of violence. Even with the violence in the rural regions of 
Afghanistan, the Soviet government was able to provide security and stability in the urban centers 
for the majority of the nation’s population. However, with the fall of Soviet-backed government 
there was an absence of authority throughout the nation. Due to this, the tribal history of 
Afghanistan expressed itself with the rise in regional warlords who began to amass more power. 
Warlords quickly secured total control of urban centers and attacked the institutions created by the 
Communist Soviet government. Schools, workplaces, and the social atmosphere in the cities 
created by the communists were violently targeted. Gopal’s interview with Heela continued into 
the civil war years of Afghanistan where she recounted that, “I went to sleep expecting to die… 
and woke up thankful for another day. We focused very hard on our prayers because that’s all we 
had.”49 Under the Soviets urban Afghans enjoyed access to the new opportunities due to state 
building objectives. Life dramatically changed for the residents of these cities as they were forced 
 
48 Mandaville, Peter G. Islam and Politics. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2020.  
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to adapt to the new norms imposed by warlords or suffered violent actions which warlords used to 
solidify their power.  
 While warlords scrambled for power in the wake of the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan, a 
group founded from the Mujahideen, known as the Taliban, began to emerge within Pakistan. 
Founded in 1994, and translated roughly to “the student,” the Taliban was established to create an 
Islamic State in Afghanistan. They believed in strict adherence to Shar’ia and prohibited anything 
that was deemed as Un-Islamic.50 The Taliban had the means to provide peace and security in 
Afghanistan, in exchange for the imposition of their Muslim jurisprudence. Taliban forces 
systemically worked to collect power and land throughout Afghanistan through direct force, the 
threat of force, and establishing agreements with warlords. As veterans of the war against the 
Soviets, Taliban forces had the military experience and organizational infrastructure to maintain 
control throughout Afghanistan. In 1996 the Taliban officially took control of the government of 
Afghanistan and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.  
Life under the Taliban required strict adherence to the Taliban’s unique Shia Islamic 
jurisprudence through the threat and use of force. According to Jones, “the Taliban’s religious 
ideology was particularly apparent in Kabul, a city that most Taliban viewed as modern, 
implacably corrupt, and bubbling with apostacy.”51 In fact “on September 28, 1996, Radio Kabul 
announced: ‘Thieves will have their hands and feet amputated, adulterers will be stoned to death 
and those taking liquor will be lashed.’” 52  The Taliban brought security and stability to 
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Afghanistan which had not existed since before the Soviet invasion in 1979. As an “external power,” 
the Taliban worked to build their version of a state through Ethnic Antipathy where a “once a 
previously disadvantaged group takes control of the state, its ruling political elites are likely to 
target the previously advantaged group(s) with exclusionary policies.” 53  By using their strict 
interpretation of Shar’ia, the Taliban were able to target those who benefitted from the Soviets in 
the urban centers where women were able to benefit from state building efforts. Individuals who 
served in the Afghan government before the invasion were also targeted by the Taliban. By using 
local warlords, they in fact were able to secure legitimate sovereignty from the people due to the 
tribal nature of Afghanistan. They rigidly implemented assimilation policies to “secure the loyalty 
of an individual or a community by “conquering” their belief system and ensuring their obedience 
to the national state.”54 By implementing their jurisprudence of Shar’ia, the Taliban focused less 
on the state building but instead on security and stability as evident in their interactions with 
Afghan citizens.  
It is important to note that during this time the United States changed their foreign policy 
focus away from Afghanistan. The Taliban had a near enemy agenda that did not reference an anti-
Western version of fundamentalism. Due to the complications in other international actions such 
as the Balkans and in Somalia, a secure Afghanistan was not a pressing concern in United States 
foreign policy. The Taliban focused on order within Afghanistan, another organization known has 
the Al ’Qaeda originated from the Mujahedeen as well with a different end goal. 
Rise and tactics of the Al ’Qaeda: 
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After the removal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, thousands of experienced Muslim 
soldiers had the training and means for combat but suddenly lacked an enemy, until some turned 
towards for the far enemy.55  The leading body in this push to fight the far enemy were the 
Al ’Qaeda forces, which were led by Osama Bin Laden. As an experienced Saudi Arabian financer 
with connections throughout the Muslim world, Bin Laden saw an opportunity to develop and 
spread his own jurisprudence of Islam through Al ’Qaeda forces. Published in their original 
manifesto in 1988 Bin Laden and the Al ’Qaeda, which translates as “the Base”56 had the goal of 
removing all non-Muslims from Muslim states and to destroy all Muslim regimes that did not align 
with their jurisprudence. Furthermore, they sought to defeat the Far Enemy both within the Muslim 
countries and beyond. In the fight against the Far enemy various methods were used ranging from 
suicide bombers, planted explosives, and other means of unconventional warfare in order to spread 
fear.   
 The label of Far enemy by the Al ’Qaeda applied to both geography, origin of beliefs, and 
political ideals. For example, the United States, United Kingdom, and the rest of the Western world 
was under this label due to their distant location to the Muslim World. They speak different 
languages, have different traditions, and often practice different faiths, while when even Muslims 
in these countries. According to members of Al ‘Qaeda, Muslims would live in the West, in nations 
regarded as the far enemy, do not follow the proper jurisprudence. Although geographically part 
of the Muslim world, Israel was another state deemed the far enemy due to its relationship with 
the West and its large Jewish population. There have been decades of violence against Muslims 
 
55 The term far enemy is a label used to classify individuals and states that typically value what are considered 
“western values” which are Un-Islamic in the eyes of the Al ‘Qaeda. The term near enemy is another label that is 
applied to secular Muslim regimes because of the perceived fundamental difference between secularism and 
democracy with Islam.   
56 Mandaville, Peter G. Islam and Politics. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2020.  
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was committed by Jewish Israelis with Western military technology. Finally, any nation or group 
that supported democracy also received the same label as the far enemy as, according to the Al 
‘Qaeda, democracy fundamentally disagrees with Islam. Within the Muslim faith, one of the pillars 
is the oneness of God and his absolute sovereignty. This means that Allah has the ultimate power, 
and nothing is more powerful than his decisions and his right to rule over everything. However, in 
democracy the power is placed in the hands of the people and their decision-making process which 
in essence would remove power from Allah in the Muslim world. In order to combat this, the 
Al ’Qaeda began to label Muslim democracies or nations that worked with Western democracies 
and shared similar beliefs as near enemies in order to justify their violence.  
Although the group’s base of operation was in flux throughout its early years of operation, 
Bin Laden was able to create a complex terrorist organization that demonstrated its capabilities 
quickly. In the 1990s Al ’Qaeda operations had moved to Sudan and there were vast connections 
established throughout the Middle East and Africa. Bin Laden was able to move funds throughout 
the Muslim world through the hawala system, which is honor based system that does not require 
the direct transfer of funds. While based in Sudan, members of Al ‘Qaeda successfully carried out 
multiple attacks including the bombing of the USS Cole and United States Embassies in Nairobi 
and Tanzania.57 Additionally, there was an attack in 1993 on the World Trade Centers in New 
York City. It must be noted that Ramzi Yousef the main perpetrator of this bombing had no direct 
ties to Al ‘Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden but was the nephew to Khalid Sheikh Mohammad the 
mastermind behind the attacks on 9/11. In 1996, Al ’Qaeda operations returned back to 
Afghanistan through a mutually beneficially relationship with the Taliban which led Islamic 
 
57 Mandaville, Peter G. Islam and Politics. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2020.  
23
McDougal: Will the Peace Plan Bring Peace to Afghanistan? A look at the His
Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2021
 24 
Emirate of Afghanistan. While in their early years of operating their country, the Taliban had found 
themselves with a shortage of capita. In exchange for funding from the Al ’Qaeda, the Taliban 
granted large amounts of land to Bin Laden where large training camps were rapidly constructed. 
By the turn of the century, Osama Bin Laden believed that “the Americans were paper tigers who 
could be made to run in less than twenty-four hours.”58 With this mindset, Bin Laden believed that 
he had the capacity to launch an offensive attack against the United States without fear of 
retaliation. Through this relationship both members benefitted as Al ’Qaeda training capacity 
increased without interference while the Taliban gained access to needed funds that were required 
to maintain security and stability in the early years of their governance.   
9/11 and US Response: 
 Leading up to the invasion of Afghanistan directly after 9/11, it is important to note the 
disparity of opinions amongst United States foreign policy makers towards Afghanistan and the 
greater Middle East and west Asian region. Under President Clinton, the United State engaged in 
a variety of international operations with goals of state and nation building. Although there were 
successes, American lives and billions of dollars were lost which began to change some opinions 
in Washington D.C. Now in the wake of a direct attack on American soil, these varying opinions 
began to arise. David Petraeus, a four-star US Army General who oversaw Operation Enduring 
Freedom “notes that ‘(o)ne cannot adequately address the challenges in Afghanistan without 
adding Pakistan into the equation.”59 Additionally, Petraeus believes that “those seeking to help 
Afghanistan and Pakistan need to widen the aperture even further, to encompass at least the Central 
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Asian states, India, Iran, and even China and Russia.”60 However these values were not shared as 
the original sentiment from President Bush, Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary 
Rumsfeld did not reflect the previous president of the US. It soon became apparent after 9/11 that 
“the initial interventions were not a response to civil war or to support a peace settlement and were 
not triggered by requests from inside the country they ‘are profoundly different from those of most 
state building operations.” 61  The United States operations in Afghanistan began as a 
counterterrorism mission, but the overall mission was became greater than that.  
While the Al ’Qaeda had already been labeled as a terrorist organization according to the 
US State Department and taken the lives of United States citizens, the events of the morning of 
September 11th, 2001 forever changed the image and opinion of the Al ’Qaeda. When American 
Airlines flight 11 and United Airlines flight 175 struck the World Trade Center towers, American 
Airlines flight 77 at the Pentagon, and United Airlines flight 93 in rural Pennsylvania on its way 
to the White House, Bin Laden and all of Al ’Qaeda became the top enemy in the war on terror. 
In the end, nearly 3,000 lives were lost that morning on American soil and that required a rapid 
response in the eyes of the American public. In early planning the United States reached out to the 
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and then Emir Mullah Omar in regard to their relationship with 
Al ’Qaeda.  An ultimatum was presented where the Taliban could either maintain a relationship 
with the United States or the Al ’Qaeda. However, “the Taliban refused the Bush Administration’s 
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demand to extradite Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden”62 and Emir Mullah Omar sided with Bin 
Laden and his forces.  
 Directly after the events on 9/11, “General Tommy Frank’s war plan, which became known 
as Operation Enduring Freedom,”63 was adopted by President Bush as plan to defeat the Al’Qaeda 
and Taliban, but also ensure security in Afghanistan. On October 7th, 2001 the first US operatives 
were deployed to Afghanistan to begin this new era of warfare against an enemy that was not a 
nation. 64  General Tommy Frank’s war plan included four phases. This first phase required 
unconventional tactics in the beginning, United States Special Operations soldiers along with 
members of the CIA worked with and increased the fighting capacity of the Northern Alliance 
which had resisted the Taliban governance of Afghanistan. US forces provided training, weapons, 
and direction action support. Imbedded as a free-lance reporter with the Northern Alliance, Sarah 
Chayes remembers when the Alliance hoped that “maybe the Americans will give us some 
[weapons]”65  and the next morning a CIA truck arrived with “some six hundred brand-new 
Kalashnikovs and machine guns and grenade launchers- straight from Pakistan.”66 The second 
phase relied on the use of established airfields in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, along with the USS 
Enterprise and USS Carl Vision, both aircraft carriers, which allowed the United States the ability 
to provide overwhelming air support which could not be countered on the ground by the Al ’Qaeda. 
In fact, “according to the U.S. Air Force, during the initial 76 days of bombing, some 6,500 strike 
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sorties were flown, with 17,500 dropped on over 520 targets.”67 While Special Forces continued 
their partnered attacks with the Northern Alliance, the conventional military was mobilizing for 
an invasion of Afghanistan. 
 The third phase of Operation Enduring Freedom was the invasion of Afghanistan, which 
had a clear mission set and was successful due strength and capabilities of United States forces. In 
the original plans for the invasion were to remove the Taliban from power, destroy all Al ’Qaeda 
forces, and to destroy all training camps. This invasion marked the beginning of the global war on 
terror as the enemy in this fight was a terrorist organization that was going to be combatted by a 
multinational coalition. The United States received military assistance from NATO countries and 
also had support of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) through UNSC Resolution 1368 
on September 12th, 2001 which stated support for the “readiness to take all necessary steps to 
respond to the September 11 attacks.”68 In October, US forces including soldiers and marines made 
it to Afghanistan to begin their objectives. In the early days of combat it was clear there was an 
advantage on the side of the United States as Bin Laden’s Al ’Qaeda forces were unable to sustain 
their defenses. The overwhelming fire from an advanced mechanized military force was 
unmatched. 
 Within a few months the United States and the Northern Alliance were able to defeat the 
Al ’Qaeda forces and successfully remove the Taliban from power. On December 9th, 2001, 
President George H.W. Bush announced to the American people that the United States had been 
victorious in Afghanistan. On December 5th 2001, through a CIA satellite phone, Hamid Karzai 
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received a phone call that he was to become the new President of Afghanistan. As a member of 
the Northern Alliance, he had resisted the rule of the Taliban but in the eyes of the West had the 
skills to run this newly liberated nation. He was not the only Afghan that received a phone call that 
day, as a conference in Bonn, Germany held by the UNSC selected an entire cabinet of Afghan 
natives to run the new nation. This was the first major state building action by the international 
community by working to establish a functioning hierarchy of government with specific roles. The 
UNSC outlined a full cabinet for the Afghan government as the first step to build the Afghan State. 
This was a clear action of state building by the UNSC in an effort to create a permanent system of 
Afghan citizen lead government. However, these individuals would not be left alone to govern as 
the United States began to deviate from its original mission set after victory was declared on 
December 9th, 2001. 
Reconstruction of Afghanistan Under President Bush: 
Before looking at the actions taken by the Bush Administration after the initial defeat of 
the Taliban and Al ‘Qaeda, the beliefs of Bush and his cabinet need to be addressed. Before the 
events on 9/11, as a Republican President in his first year his domestic policy echoed the call from  
“U.S. conservatives stressing reducing the size of the state sector, free market solutions to public 
policy problems, and the unintended consequences and negative externalities generated by large 
government programs.”69 This is an important message to consider as he campaigned and was 
elected on the mission of reducing big government policies both domestic and aboard. This 
principle remained true even after the attacks on 9/11: 
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There would be no ‘foreign policy as social work’, no extended forays into the nation 
building that had bogged the Clinton Administration down in far-flung countries that were 
of little direct interest to the US. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Bush repeated this 
injunction, ‘I don’t want to nation-build with troops.’70 
 
Although General Frank’s four-part plan had a fourth phase which called for stability and security 
in Afghanistan, the early message for the invasion of Afghanistan was purely retaliation and 
revenge for the attack on US soil. When Payne writes “less than three weeks before the attack, 
President Bush asked the national-security advisor Condoleezza Rice, “Who will run the country?” 
It was a moment of panic for her because she had not given the issue any thought.”71 It is evident 
that state building in Afghanistan was an afterthought in Operation Enduring Freedom.  
In December of 2001 there were 1,300 US troops in Afghanistan with a retreating 
Al ’Qaeda and a scattered Taliban regime, and the final phase of establishing stability and security 
was set to begin with no real plan. Soldiers and Marines who were trained and prepared for 
sustained combat no longer had an apparent enemy. Instead, these military forces were forced to 
transform into a variety of roles including police force, construction workers, government advisors, 
and instructors on how to build a “free society.” They lacked the training and experience on how 
to be successful nation builders. In an interview with Tommy Furlough, a retired Marine Captain 
from the 6th Regiment who was deployed in Afghanistan, he described his experiences where he 
was trained as an infantry man whose training centered around the ideal of “being a fighting force 
who essentially is trained in killing our way out of problem.”72 However in 2002 he was forced to 
“figure it out on the fly”, when his mission changed to rebuilding a village and assisting in 
establishing the authority of the Afghan Government. The mission became increasingly difficult 
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due to lack of resources in critical areas such as “for its first four months of existence, from 
December 2001 to March 2002, Hamid Karzai’s provisional government had no budget to pay 
civil servants or police officers.”73 Captain Furlough was not alone in these efforts and for over a 
year US forces attempted to rebuild Afghanistan under a Commander in Chief who “openly 
repeated this injunction, ‘I don’t want to nation-build with troops.”74 
However, as the US remained involved in Afghanistan due to the resilience of Al’Qaeda 
and the Taliban, the complexity of the mission became apparent. According to Monten, “in the 
National Security Council meetings there was a working assumption that US troops would be 
withdrawn as soon as possible.”75 In 2003, after being actively engaged in Afghanistan, President 
Bush states in a speech that, “there was a time when many said that the cultures of Japan and 
Germany were incapable of sustaining democratic values. Well, they were wrong.” 76  When 
looking at this comparison, it is a clear example of President Bush attempt to label the mission in 
Afghanistan as a Westphalian peacekeeping operation. President Bush was naïve to assume that 
the population of Afghanistan possessed the same understand of nationalism and statehood that 
German and Japanese citizens. By waiting over a year to recognize and identify the need for an 
increase in the investment in Afghanistan, the President Bush and the United States were not in an 
advantageous position in their state building effort. To that end, without state building there was 
no means to begin to the much more complex mission of nation building and constructing a form 
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of national identity and citizenship. The interim government of President Karzai lacked the 
resources to gain the full trust of the Afghan people.   
In late 2003, another four-part plan was developed by the United States to build the nation 
of Afghanistan. This plan was multifaceted and encompassed the actions of local ownership and 
emphasizing the sovereignty of the Afghan population. The policy included: 
“‘the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections.’ ‘Our objective is to enable the 
Afghan government to stand on its own feet, to ... put in place an effective government.’ 
‘Our focus is to work with the Afghan government to improve the quality of life of the 
people and to put in place an economic infrastructure to support a private sector-led 
economy, development of Afghan security institutions, with the rapid and extensive 
Expansion of the Afghan National Army.’”77 
 
In order to accomplish this new mission, there was a call for greater international collaboration 
with the help of NATO and other partner nations. The United States and coalition forces were able 
to facilitate a legitimate election where President Karzai was re-elected. However, according to 
the Bush administration in 2006, the US role has evolved and expanded as the coalition support 
began to waiver. In the Fall of 2006, there was an order for “a troop increase from about 20,000 to 
more than 30,000” as “the United States more than doubled funding for reconstruction, increased 
the size of the Afghan National Army, expanded intelligence efforts, and worked to reduce 
corruption in the new Afghan government.78 In regard to the wavering coalition support, Canadian 
political scientist, Roland Paris authored the article, “NATO’s Choice in Afghanistan: Go Big or 
 
77 Monten, Jonathan. “Intervention and State-Building: Comparative Lessons from Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan.” 
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Go Home,” where he called “for an honest reckoning of NATO’s progress in Afghanistan.”79 He 
cited a RAND corporation study that investigated the relationship between troop numbers of nation 
builders and the host population. The study found that “In Afghanistan, the ratio is a paltry 1.4 per 
1,000.” He believed that it “is not enough, as events have amply demonstrated. Adding 20,000 
more troops in Afghanistan would raise the ratio to about 2 per 1,000 inhabitants.”80 Additionally 
he references the study where “in Germany after the Second World War there were 101 Allied 
troops per 1,000 people.”81 In conclusion, Paris had a pessimistic outlook on NATO’s involvement 
in Afghanistan: 
The defeat will come slowly, not on the battlefield but in the minds of ordinary Afghans, 
most of whom simply want security and opportunity for themselves and their families. If 
the legitimately elected government of Afghanistan and its foreign backers cannot provide 
such essentials, Afghans will look elsewhere. That is exactly what the Taliban and their 
allies are counting on.82 
 
    Therefore, while President Bush claimed that the effort in Afghanistan was that of the United 
States effort in Germany, there was failure to provide the necessary resources of the same scale 
leaving Paris to wonder how the same result is expected.  
Under the President Bush the emphasis of state building was focused on the security of the 
state and supporting President Karzai. The two main goals in state building in Afghanistan after 
the Taliban left office were to establish a new government and to gain security of the state. When 
looking at the Afghan government the “U.S. intervention focused both on expanding the scope of 
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the Afghan state and on building the strength of Afghan institutions.”83 This was due to the fact 
that the “Afghan state was historically small in both scope and strength, often providing a minimal 
degree of security and a basic economic system.”84 As a result the United States invested heavily 
in the expansion of the Afghan state with increased services in education, civil service, and local 
government. However, Monten argued that “the international intervention created a state that was 
both “overcentralized” and “underresourced.”85 This led to the creation of an inefficient state that 
slowly began to be taken over with corruption and inability. There was not much success either in 
the other goal of security: 
In terms of establishing security, the United States, NATO, and the Afghan government 
struggled to defeat the Taliban-led insurgency, and despite a large U.S. investment in 
training national military and police forces, these forces have struggled to operate 
effectively independent of U.S. support.86 
 
By being reliant on external actors for security, the legitimacy of the Afghan government continued 
to suffer. When looking at the state building efforts under President Bush, through the criteria of 
scholars, the United States had early success but as time went on the sentiment shifted. Gregg 
wrote about local ownership and a host population’s willingness to work with state building 
efforts.87 In the beginning, there was a strong connection between the United States and the Afghan 
people so much that they celebrated when US forces entered Kabul. All signs pointed to the 
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opportunity for success, however as time went on and the interim government was assigned offices 
the local “buy-in” began to waiver. After the government inefficacies became even more apparent, 
the criteria that Chuck called for in local ownership in nation building no longer existed. Under 
the Bush administration both the state and nation building efforts of the United States failed in 
Afghanistan from the initial invasion until the end of his presidency in January 2009. As the 
external power, the United States and coalition forces used an exclusionary tactic to combat the 
Taliban and remove the non-core group from power. Those efforts were paired with assimilation 
in expanding the Afghan state. However, with both of these policies dependent on the United States, 
there was no sustainable growth and ownership taken by the core group. This can be attributed to 
the fact that the external powers made all the decisions for the core group. From the beginning, the 
goal of the mission was combating the Taliban and Al’ Qaeda, with the Afghan people being the 
afterthought. In fact, this was seen as a future problem to be fixed. With the inability to complete 
the Al’ Qaeda and Taliban forces, the focus of the Bush state and nation building effort never fully 
was turned to the people of Afghanistan and their needs. 
Reconstruction of Afghanistan Under President Obama: 
As President Obama took office in January 2009, he was faced with a difficult task of a 
recession in the United States and a bleak situation in Afghanistan. However, United States interest 
in Afghanistan did not waiver with Democrat President Obama taking office in 2009 as is early 
plan called for a surge of resources in Afghanistan. On December 1st, 2009 President Obama 
announced his foreign policy for Afghanistan: 
  “‘We will bring this war to a successful conclusion.’ He strategized in a way that would 
 ‘seek to reverse Taliban gains in large parts of Afghanistan, better protect the Afghan 
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 people, increase the pressure on Afghanistan to build its own military capacity, create a 
 more effective government, and step up attacks on al- Qaeda in Pakistan.’”88  
 
In order to successfully administer this new policy the total number of combat forces was raised 
to roughly 78,000 with additional 10,000 to with the sole purpose of training the Afghan National 
Army.”89 Additionally the “United States has provided more than US$54 billion alone to training 
and equipping Afghan military and police under the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), 
yet these organizations are still dependent on U.S. support.90 The continued reliance on the United 
States for security even after years of investment and training raised concerns about the people of 
Afghanistan’s’ personal investment in their security. 
Obama’s policy called for expanding the US-Pakistani relationship in order to create 
greater regional stability. Pakistan had aided in the initial invasion of Afghanistan against the 
Taliban and so from the Western point of view this appeared to be a valuable relationship that 
should be invested into. However, the US-Pakistani relationship came under pressure from some 
Americans due to the fact that Taliban leaders, including Osama Bin Laden sought refuge in 
Pakistan. Pakistan was hesitant to respond against Taliban and Al ‘Qaeda leaders living within 
their borders which frustrated member nations of the Coalition, especially the US. Furthermore, 
the US could not afford to completely support Pakistan due to their conflict with India, as full 
military support and assistance of Pakistan would remove the United States from neutrality in that 
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conflict and create tensions between the US and India. There was measurable success during this 
time as there was “reduced areas under Taliban control substantially and the transition to Afghan 
security leadership began on schedule in July 2011” and “the killing of Osama bin Laden 
represented a key accomplishment of the core U.S. mission.”91 
 Due to the success of this mission, the policy in Afghanistan began to change from 
rebuilding and control to withdrawal and sustainability. Within the next few years tens of 
thousands of troops would be removed from the country and “the U.S. military contingent in 
Afghanistan would be 9,800 in 2015, deployed in various parts of Afghanistan, consisting mostly 
of trainers in the NATO-led “Resolute Support Mission (RSM).”92 The RSM was a multinational 
effort to continue to strengthen the capabilities of the Afghan National Army and be able to provide 
their own security. As international forces were removed from combat and transferred into 
advisory positions, the Afghan National Army as able to function almost primarily by itself for the 
first time in ten years since the initial invasion. 
Although there was measurable progress in Afghanistan under President Obama, the 
overall condition of the state and nation building mission could not be labeled as a success. 
Expansive government built by coalition forces was not readily accepted by all Afghan citizens 
and was constantly under pressure from corrupt officials. While there were efforts to build schools 
and medical facilities these often were the first targets by the insurgent forces and became unsafe 
and forced underground. This inability to protect the foundations of the state did not build trust 
amongst the Afghan population. Traditionally in Afghanistan opium was the highest grossing 
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export and the world’s largest supplier, along with counterterrorism efforts, international actors 
attempted to combat this and transition opium farmers into cotton farmers through subsidies. In 
fact, “the estimated revenue from opium production in the past year alone was over $3 billion, 
more than double the amount of money that donor governments have contributed to the 
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund since 2002.”93 However, due to the harsh agricultural 
environment and the inability to compete with the opium profit margins, the agricultural sphere of 
Afghanistan remained dependent on opium. With billions invested into the development of 
Afghanistan, the United States and partners hoped to see significant progress. However Monten 
believed that the amount of aid had a negative impact in Afghanistan as “aid may crowd out 
domestic capacity-building: national leaders may have little incentive to invest scarce resources in 
improving state capacity in these areas while they are being accomplished by international 
actors.”94 Large amounts of untargeted aid have the ability to remove the needed commitment in 
local ownership. Although aid has the ability to help, there is the potential for the local population 
to become solely reliant on aid. This reliance on aid will remove the incentive to work and make 
progress because regardless of their efforts they have international aid to rely on. By the end of his 
Presidency, Obama had attempted to finish the job in Afghanistan but was limited in his political 
pull after the bailout of the auto industry and launch of Obamacare. The mission to rebuild 
Afghanistan had lasted over a decade and costed the United States billions of dollars and thousands 
of lives. Hence domestic support of the mission began to fail. Politicians and citizens began to 
question when would enough be enough in Afghanistan. 
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Peace Talks in Afghanistan: 
 Over the years national sentiment for United States involvement in Afghanistan has begun 
to waive and the question of peace and withdrawal have become a reality. In 2012, under the 
Obama administration, the US intelligence community and special operations forces were able to 
locate and assassinate Al ’Qaeda founder and leader Osama Bin Laden in his compound in Pakistan. 
It is worth noting, however, that national sentiment for continued involvement had begun to waiver 
before his assassination and with the mastermind of 9/11 no longer alive even more Americans 
began to question the necessity for US forces. According to a Pew Research survey, when asked 
“Do you think the United States’ initial decision to use military force in Afghanistan in 2001 was 
the right decision or the wrong decision?”95 69% of those surveyed believed it was the right 
decision with only 20% voting it as the wrong decision in January 2006. However, in September 
2018, 45% believed it was the right decision with 39% believing it to be the wrong decision96 (See 
Figure 2 for complete data). In 12 years, the attitude of the United States population went from a 
majority support of those surveyed to under half the population. During the 2016 Republican 
nominee Donald Trump campaign platform included withdrawal of all United States forces from 
Afghanistan as he said in a speech “We’re getting out of the nation-building business.”97 After his 
election, this sentiment continued into a series of peace talks between the United States and the 
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Taliban. First in 2018 and most recently in 2020, these peace talks have had varying levels of 
success according to a variety of sources.  
In the 2020 peace in Doha, Qatar there was an agreement drafted that centered on four 
main parts. These four parts included:  
1. Guarantees an enforcement mechanism that will prevent the use of the soil of 
Afghanistan by any group or individual against the security of the United States and its 
allies. 
2. Guarantees, enforcement mechanisms, and announcement of a timeline for the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan. 
3. After the announcement of guarantees for a complete withdrawal of foreign forces and 
timeline in the presence of international witnesses, and guarantees and the 
announcement in the presence of international witnesses that Afghan soil will not be 
used against the security of the United States and its allies, the Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the 
Taliban will start intra-Afghan negotiations with Afghan sides on March 10, 2020, 
which corresponds to Rajab 15, 1441 on the Hijri Lunar calendar and Hoot 20, 1398 
on the Hijri Solar calendar.  
4. A permanent and comprehensive ceasefire will be an item on the agenda of the intra-
Afghan dialogue and negotiations. The participants of intra-Afghan negotiations will 
discuss the date and modalities of a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire, including 
joint implementation mechanisms, which will be announced along with the completion 
and agreement over the future political roadmap of Afghanistan.98  
Within this agreement it is important to note that the United States choses to maintain its 
position of not negotiating or interacting with terrorist organizations as it formally will not 
recognize the Taliban in the peace agreement, they wish to enter with them. This agreement calls 
for something from everyone and it must be recognized that at this point the United States has no 
political leverage in these talks as they have continually lost the support of the Afghan citizens 
throughout the country and only have military leverage due to failures in training and establishing 
an effective Afghan military. Due to the lack of leverage the United States positioned themselves 
for complete withdrawal by reducing “U.S. forces in Afghanistan to eight thousand six hundred 
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(8,600)”, “withdrawal all forces from five (5) military bases”99, as well as “work with all relevant 
sides on a plan to expeditiously release combat and political prisoners as a confidence building 
measure with the coordination and approval of all relevant sides. Up to five thousand (5,000) 
prisoners of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.”100 However the United States was not alone in 
restrictions as a result of this agreement, as even though not officially recognized the Taliban are 
prohibited from committing or working with those who seek to threaten the security of the United 
States and its allies. This includes interacting with known members of Al ‘Qaeda but there have 
already been UN reports of the Taliban continuing interactions with Al ‘Qaeda members which is 
a breach of the Peace Deal. Additionally, the Taliban are restricted from using Afghanistan as a 
base of training operations and must comply with all international refugee and migration 
regulations.  
As a foreign nation that provided its own justification for entering the country, the United 
States has evidently lost host nation support for remaining in Afghanistan at this point. There were 
future peace talks between the Afghan government and representatives from the Taliban as a result 
of this agreement which were postponed due to the COVID-19 Pandemic. However, when 
reviewing the terms, goal of protecting the security of the United States is under serious question. 
With limited forces the United States influence throughout the nation is severely limited and will 
continue to diminish. Furthermore, the language in the agreement where “the Taliban is committed 
to deal with those seeking asylum or residence in Afghanistan… so that such persons do not pose 
a threat to the security of the United States and its allies”101 now leaves the organization that was 
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founded to combat the Unites States, as the administrative body to determine its former and current 
enemy’s security. At this moment, “it is unclear whether the Taliban is serious about reaching a 
deal or whether its leaders are negotiating simply to get U.S. troops to withdraw so Taliban forces 
can overthrow the Afghan government.”102 The true intentions of the Taliban and Al ’Qaeda are 
unknown at this point as their position in this agreement appears peaceful but their actions do not 
reflect the same message.  
At the moment, the United States military continues to operate and combat Taliban and 
Al ’Qaeda forces nearly twenty years after the initial invasion. Sadly, these US forces still sustains 
casualties in combat even into 2021. When both the Afghan and Taliban parties were finally able 
to meet in September of 2020 in Qatar, the theme of peace was not display back in Afghanistan as 
“Taliban attacks had killed 98 civilians and injured 230 others in the last two weeks across 24 
provinces.”103 In a time when there is an effort for peace in Qatar, Afghanistan continues to be 
plagued by violence.   
In an opinion piece through the Washington Post, the 7th District House of Representatives  
Representative from New Jersey, Tom Malinowski, provides two solutions to counter the 2020 
peace plan which he believes is a “sham.”104 The first would be to “stop setting deadlines for 
departure and simply say that we’re willing to keep some troops in Afghanistan for as long as the 
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Afghans want to partner with us, as we have in Germany, South Korea and elsewhere.”105 With 
mission sets and timelines outlined by the Afghan government from training to full operations, the 
United States avoids being plagued by self-imposed deadlines. To this day the US has aided in the 
security of Germany, Japan, and South Korea where former battle torn countries have been able to 
maintain a relationship with the United States and have security. Malinowski’s second solution is 
on the other end of the spectrum where the US would “decide that we truly no longer need to be 
in Afghanistan, whatever the consequences. If so, then we should just leave.”106 By severing the 
resources, deals, and peace talks that are only legitimizing the Taliban, the United States has the 
ability to rapidly leave the country. Regardless of plan, he believes that there is a fundamental 
issue with both of these plans: 
“The worst option is to tell the American people a fairy tale about peace so that we feel 
less guilty about leaving, or so Trump can brag that he made a deal. Let’s accept 
responsibility for all we’ve done in Afghanistan, for good and ill, and keep working with 
our allies there. Or let’s leave and let the Afghans decide their future themselves.”107 
 
In the end, the United States cannot ignore the actions and inactions taken over the last forty years 
in Afghanistan and believe that the 2020 peace plan is the ultimate solution to a prosperous 
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Nearly forty years after the initial invasion of the Soviet Union there is finally the 
possibility of an Afghanistan free from interference from foreign actors as a result of the 2020 
Afghanistan Peace Plan. What will the future hold for an independent Afghanistan? Reverting 
back to the civil war years directly after the retreat of the Soviet Union, Afghanistan was at a point 
where they had the capacity to govern themselves free from international or foreign intrusion. 
Within a few years the entire nation accepted the Taliban rule due to their ability to maintain 
stability and security which lead to the establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. From 
there the relationship between the Al ’Qaeda and Taliban was expanded and furthered the capacity 
of the Al’Qaeda, which enabled the attacks on 9/11. Now again there is the possibility for an 
Afghanistan without foreign actors similar to 1989. Do they now have the tools to provide their 
own security, stable economy and protect human rights, or will the country soon revert back into 
the civil war atmosphere that gave rise to Taliban control and the expansion of the Al ’Qaeda? 
Looking back primarily at the last two decades of US involvement there are a few key points that 
of handled differently could have enabled the 2020 Afghanistan peace deal to be an instrument of 
lasting peace.   
Since the initial invasion of 2001, Al ’Qaeda forces have lost their strength and capacity 
and have been unable to launch an attack against the United States on US soil. In all fronts that 
component of the mission was a success, and the strength of the United States military has 
protected US soil. Directly after this successful invasion with the removal of the Taliban and retreat 
of Al ’Qaeda, Ronald Paris argued “The United States and its allies should have made a serious 
commitment to Afghan security and reconstruction in late 2001 and early 2002, when the Taliban 
and al-Qaeda were on the run. But they did not, and we are dealing with the consequences 
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today.” 108  It took until 2003 for President Bush to attempt to label the greater mission in 
Afghanistan, in the comparison to the rebuild of Germany and Japan. However, remembering the 
ideals of General Petraeus, Afghanistan operates in a larger complex regional dynamic that is not 
similar to Western Europe or Japan. Efforts late in the Bush presidency in 2006, then all actions 
by President Obama were attempts to catch up for early inaction.  
With a failing mission and billions invested, the 2020 peace plan was an attempt to remove 
the United States from theater, but this action too will be another moment of failure of US policy 
in Afghanistan. The responsibility of security and stability will rely on the Afghan National Army 
and a promise made by the Taliban and Al ’Qaeda. It cannot be ignored that Al ’Qaeda forces have 
survived and continue to find the means to carry out their terror after twenty years of the United 
States occupation and assault, which begs the question their capacity without US interference. 
Additionally, the 2020 Russian and Al ’Qaeda bounty program demonstrates that other nations 
that are regarded as enemies of the United States might also use the US withdrawal to expand their 
sphere of influence. Looking across the border to Iraq, it is clear that there is a strong relationship 
between Iran and Iraq. In 2003 the United States invaded Iraq and spent billions removing the 
Saddam regime and in nation building efforts, but the lasting impression of that mission is a 
questionably democratically elected government that is no longer allies with the United States. 
Whether it is future influence from Russia or Iran, the potential for an enemy nation of the United 
States to gain influence in Afghanistan is a potential risk after a full withdrawal. Another example 
that must be looked at is the current crisis in Yemen where a multi-sided civil war has created a 
humanitarian crisis due to constant fighting. Saudi Arabia, Iran, the former Yemeni government, 
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ISIS and Al ‘Qaeda all have forces vying for control. It makes one wonder if the United States 
were to leave Afghanistan, Afghanistan could potentially turn into the next Yemen crisis due to 
pressure already from Iran through Iraq, Pakistan, and now Russia. 
Finally, since 2001, the United States has spent $133 billion dollars in the global war on 
terror in Afghanistan, which has cost the lives of 2,419 and counting American service members.109 
Between rebuilding, education, training and access to materials, there are resources in Afghanistan 
that could be used against the United States if the country were to no longer share the same interests. 
The 2020 peace plan will not lead to an effective resolution to this multi-decade conflict. Instead 
it will tarnish the sacrifice of thousands of soldiers. In order to protect the legacy of the mission in 
Afghanistan, the United States at the moment needs to remain deployed in Afghanistan for both 
the security of the US and the stability of Afghanistan.  
The United States must re-evaluate its perspective and plans in Afghanistan in order to 
attempt to make up for inaction during the first couple years. Representative Malinowski provided 
two new plans for the United States. He suggested that in order to protect the investment of security 
and help the people of Afghanistan there needs to be a greater investment in Afghanistan. To that 
end, policy makers need to remember the advice of General Petraeus and look at the greater 
regional dynamic. According to Berger and Reese, “Washington and its allies should focus on a 
grand strategy for the Middle East and Asia”110 as peace in Afghanistan will not be the solution to 
everything as people and ideas will always move to different locations. However, if enough 
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political environments share a common disapproval for such ideas and perspectives then success 
might finally be reached.  
 By looking at the history and current situation of Afghanistan, the greater question that 
needs to be examined is the United States and their actions of nation and state building. After Cold 
War the United States stood as the global hegemon and was unmatched in their influence across 
the globe. While once the world’s leading economy, the United States invested heavily in state 
building projects to rebuild the nations it promised to rescue. Although the mechanisms of states 
were rebuilt, the great project of building a nation and a national identity was often never achieved. 
However, as we enter the 21st century the position of the United States and its capacity to be a sole 
influencer can be questioned due to the globalized community with the rise of nations such as 
China and India. By no longer being the global hegemon, the United States has now more than 
ever has lost its ability to both build a state and establish a national identity. At this point "building 
a national state means creating a sovereign center of political accountability, which is not 
necessarily the same as building an ally in the war on terror”111 and the existing “doctrines of the 
states and organizations engaged in this effort often contradict the goal of state-building.” It can 
no longer be the responsibility or mission of one nation to facilitate nation building in another 
country. There needs to be a multinational effort that works alongside with NGOs, multinational 
corporations (MNCs) and host nation populations in order to ensure that a proper plan is developed 
and the proper concerns addressed. There is no simple four step plan that can be enacted as 
“multilateral operations often consist of juxtaposing existing capacities humanitarian aid, war 
fighting, peacekeeping, economic guidance and assistance, civil society support, democracy 
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assistance without a coherent strategy.”112 The international community has failed the people of 
Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion of 1979, through US invasion in 2001. And now the 2020 
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Populations that do not share the same pre-
modern ethnic community with the core-
group are more likely to be excluded or 
accommodated than targeted with 
assimilationist policies 
H2. Statues Reversal/ Ethnic 
Antipathy 
Once a previously disadvantaged group 
takes control of the state its ruling political 
elites are likely to target the previously 
advantaged group(s) with exclusionary 
policies.  
H3. Reputation Governments faced with few secessionists 
non-core groups are more likely to pursue 
exclusionary (or assimilationist) policies 
than governments with fewer non-core 
groups in order to signal resolve and 










H4. “The Dark Side of 
Democracy” 
The international diffusion of the ideal of 
popular rule during democratization puts 
pressure to convert demos into ethnos, this 
in turn generates organic nationalism, and 
it ultimately encourages ethnic cleansing 
of those that do not fit the definition of 
ethnos. 
H5. National Homeland Non-core groups with an external 
homeland are more likely to be targeted 
for exclusion than assimilation because of 
the security threat they pose and the high 
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